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Abstrat
We onsider the problem of designing the the utility funtions of the utility-maximizing
agents in a multi-agent system (MAS) so that they work synergistially to maximize a global
utility. The partiular problem domain we explore is the ontrol of network routing by
plaing agents on all the routers in the network. Conventional approahes to this task have
the agents all use the Ideal Shortest Path routing Algorithm (ISPA). We demonstrate that
in many ases, due to the side-eets of one agent's ations on another agent's performane,
having agents use ISPA's is suboptimal as far as global aggregate ost is onerned, even
when they are only used to route innitesimally small amounts of traÆ. The utility
funtions of the individual agents are not \aligned" with the global utility, intuitively
speaking. As a partiular example of this we present an instane of Braess' paradox in
whih adding new links to a network whose agents all use the ISPA results in a derease
in overall throughput. We also demonstrate that load-balaning, in whih the agents'
deisions are olletively made to optimize the global ost inurred by all traÆ urrently
being routed, is suboptimal as far as global ost averaged aross time is onerned. This
is also due to \side-eets", in this ase of urrent routing deision on future traÆ. The
mathematis of Colletive Intelligene (COIN) is onerned preisely with the issue of
avoiding suh deleterious side-eets in multi-agent systems, both over time and spae.
We present key onepts from that mathematis and use them to derive an algorithm
whose ideal version should have better performane than that of having all agents use
the ISPA, even in the innitesimal limit. We present experiments verifying this, and also
showing that a mahine-learning-based version of this COIN algorithm in whih osts are
only impreisely estimated via empirial means (a version potentially appliable in the real
world) also outperforms the ISPA, despite having aess to less information than does the
ISPA. In partiular, this COIN algorithm almost always avoids Braess' paradox.
1. Introdution
There is a long history of AI researh on the design of distributed omputational systems,
strething from Distributed AI (Huhns, 1987) through urrent work on multi-agent systems
(MAS's) (Claus & Boutilier, 1998; Hu & Wellman, 1998a; Jennings, Syara, & Wooldridge,
1998; Sandholm, Larson, Anderson, Shehory, & Tohme, 1998; Syara, 1998). When the
individual agents in suh a system eah have personal utility funtions they are trying to
maximize and we also have a `world utility' that rates the possible dynami histories of
the overall system, suh a MAS onstitutes a `olletive'. In this paper we are partiularly
onerned with agents that use mahine learning tehniques (e.g., Reinforement Learning
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(RL) Kaelbing, Littman, & Moore, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Sutton, 1988; Watkins &
Dayan, 1992) to try to maximize their utilities.
The eld of Colletive Intelligene (COIN) is onerned with the entral design problem
for olletives (Wolpert, Tumer, & Frank, 1999; Wolpert & Tumer, 1999): How, without
any detailed modeling of the overall system, an one set utility funtions for the individual
agents in a COIN so that the overall dynamis reliably and robustly ahieves large values
of the provided world utility? In other words, how an we leverage an assumption that
our learners are individually fairly good at what they do, to have the olletive as a whole
perform well?
1
An example of where this question looms very large is the problem of how to optimize the
ow of ertain entities (e.g., information pakets, ars) from soures to destinations aross
a network of routing nodes. Here we are onerned with the version of the problem in
whih \optimization" onsists of minimizing aggregate ost inurred by the entities owing
to their destinations, and where an agent ontrols the routing deisions of eah node in
the network. This problem underlies the distributed ontrol of a large array of real-world
domains, inluding internet routing, voie/video ommuniation, traÆ ows, et. From
the COIN perspetive, the problem redues to the question of what goals one ought to
provide to eah router's agent so that eah agent's self-interestedly pursuing its own utility
results in maximal throughput of the entire system (\inentive engineering").
In this paper we investigate the appliation of reently developed COIN tehniques,
to this routing domain. Like all work onerning COINs, these tehniques are designed
to be very broadly appliable, and in partiular are not designed for the routing domain.
Aordingly, their performane in this domain serves as a good preliminary indiation of
their more general usefulness.
To ground the disussion, we will onentrate on the teleommuniations data routing
problem where the entities being routed are pakets. Currently, many real-world algorithms
for this problem are based on the Shortest Path Algorithm (SPA). In this algorithm eah
routing node in the network is ontrolled by an agent who maintains a \routing table" of the
\shortest paths" (i.e., sequenes of links having minimal total inurred osts) from its node
to eah of the possible destination nodes in the net. Then at eah moment the agent satises
any routing requests for a partiular destination node by sending all its pakets down the
assoiated shortest path. Many Ideal SPA (ISPA) algorithms exist for eÆiently omputing
the shortest path when agent-to-agent path-ost ommuniation is available and the osts
for traversing eah agent's node are unvarying in time, e.g., Dijkstra's Algorithm (Ahuja,
Magnanti, & Orlin, 1993; Bertsekas & Gallager, 1992; Deo & Pang, 1984; Dijkstra, 1959).
If a non-innitesimal amount of traÆ is to be routed to a partiular destination at some
moment by some agent, then that agent's sending all that traÆ down a single path will
not result in minimal ost, no matter how that single path is hosen. However if it must
hoose a single path for all its traÆ, and if the routing deisions by all other agents are
xed, then tautologially by using the ISPA the agent hooses the best suh path, as far as
the traÆ it is routing is onerned. Aordingly, in the limit of routing an innitesimally
1. The lak of detailed modeling ensures that we do not fae the problems of \brittleness" that sometimes
aompany mismath between the real world and the assumptions onerning it built into non-adaptive,
\hard-wired" agents in large MAS's. In turn, this lak of modeling is what auses us to onentrate on
adaptive, RL-based agents.
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small amount of traÆ, with all other agents' strategies being a \bakground", the ISPA is
the optimal (least aggregate inurred ost) routing strategy for the traÆ of the assoiated
single agent onsidered individually.
One might hope that more generally, if the agent must allot all of its traÆ to a single
path and all other agents' traÆ deisions are xed, then its hoosing that path via the
ISPA would be the hoie that minimizes total inurred ost of all traÆ aross the net, at
least in the limit of innitesimally little traÆ. This is not the ase though, beause in using
the SPA the agent is not onerned with the deleterious side-eets of its ations on the
osts to the traÆ routed by other agents (Korilis, Lazar, & Orda, 1997a; Wolpert et al.,
1999). The problem is made all the worse if the other agents are allowed to hange their
deisions in response to our agent's deision. In the extreme ase, as elaborated below, if
all agents were to try to minimize their personal osts via ISPA's, then the agents would
atually all reeive higher ost than would be the ase under an alternative set of strategies.
This is an instane of the famous Tragedy Of the Commons (TOC) (Hardin, 1968).
Deleterious side-eets need not be restrited to extend over spae; they an also extend
over time. Indeed, onsider the algorithm of having all agents at a given moment make
routing deisions that optimize global ost inurred by the traÆ urrently being routed,
an algorithm often alled \load-balaning" (LB) (Heusse, Snyers, Guerin, & Kuntz, 1998).
By denition, LB avoids the deleterious side-eets over spae that an result in the TOC
for the osts inurred by the traÆ urrently being routed. However, due to side-eets
over time, even onventional LB an be suboptimal as far as global ost averaged aross
time is onerned. Intuitively, one would have to use \load-balaning over time" to ensure
truly optimal performane. So even if one ould somehow onstrut a distributed protool
governing the the agents that aused them to implement LB, still one would not have
gotten theme to all at in a perfetly oordinated fashion. Suh diÆulties make this an
appropriate domain in whih to investigate how well COIN tehniques work in pratie.
Real-world SPA's (RSPA) work by applying an ISPA to the estimated osts for traversing
eah path of every agent. Typially those estimates will be in error beause agent-to-agent
ommuniation is not instantaneous, and therefore routing tables may be based on out of
date information. More generally though, even if that ommuniation were instantaneous,
the ost to traverse an agent's node may be dierent by the time the paket arrives at
that node. Aordingly, in general the performane of RSPA's is bounded above by that
of the assoiated ISPA. In this paper we do not wish to investigate suh topis, but rather
to highlight the issue of side-eets. Aordingly we \rig the game" in our experimental
omparisons in favor of the SPA, by using ISPA's rather than RSPA's.
In general, even without side-eets, determining the optimal solution to a ow problem
(e.g., determining what the loads on eah link need to be to maximize throughput on a
non-ooperative data network) an be nontratable (Ahuja et al., 1993; Orda, Rom, & Sidi,
1993b). Therefore, we will onern ourselves with providing good solutions that avoid the
diÆulties the ISPA has with side-eets. It is not our aim here to present algorithms
that nd the best possible (perfetly load-balaned over time) solution. Previous work on
using mahine learning to improve routing has sometimes resulted in better performane
than (non-idealized) SPA's (Littman & Boyan, 1993; Boyan & Littman, 1994; Stone, 2000;
Marbah, Mihatsh, Shulte, & Tsisiklis, 1998). That work has not grappled with the
entral COIN design problem however.
361
Wolpert & Tumer
In Setion 2 we disuss SPA's deienies and in partiular their manifestations in
Braess' paradox. Then, in Setion 3 we present the theory of olletive intelligene, an
approah that promises to overome those deienies. We then disuss the routing model
we will use in our experiments, and show how the theory of COINs an be applied to that
model to provide an alternative to shortest path algorithms in Setion 3. In Setion 5
we present simulation results with that model omparing ISPA to COINs. These results
demonstrate that in networks running ISPA, the per paket osts an be as muh as 32
% higher than in networks running algorithms based on COIN theory. In partiular, even
though it only has aess to impreise estimates of osts (a handiap that does not hold for
ISPA), the COIN-based algorithm almost always avoids Braess' paradox, in stark ontrast
to the ISPA. In that the ost inurred with ISPA's is presumably a lower bound on that
of an SPA not privy to instantaneous ommuniation, the impliation is that COINs an
outperform suh real-world SPA's. We onlude that the tehniques of the eld of olletive
intelligene an be highly eetive in designing the utility funtions of the members of a MAS
to ensure they work in a oordinated and eÆient manner to optimize overall performane.
2. Suboptimality of Shortest Path Routing and Braess Paradox
In this setion we rst demonstrate the suboptimality of an SPA when we have multiple
agents making simultaneous routing deisions, where no agent knows ahead of time the
other's hoie, and therefore does not know ahead of time exatly what the osts will be.
We then demonstrate that suh suboptimality an hold even when only one agent is making
a deision, and it knows what deisions the others have previously made. Next we present
Braess' paradox, a partiularly pointed instane of these eets (for other disussion of
Braess' paradox in SPA routing, see Bass, 1992; Cohen & Kelly, 1990; Cohen & Jeries,
1997; Hogg, 1995; Glane & Hogg, 1995; Korilis, Lazar, & Orda, 1999).
2.1 Suboptimality of SPA
Perhaps the simplest example of how individual greed on the part of all agents an lead
to their olletive detriment ours when two agents determine that their shortest path is
through a shared link with a limited apaity, while both have a seond option that is slightly
less preferable. In suh a ase, their using the ommon link degrades the performane of
both parties, sine due to limited apaity the performane of that link will quikly fall
below that of their seond option.
More preisely, onsider the ase where the shared link has a ost given by x
3
when
traversed by x pakets, and where eah router has an optional seond link to the destination
where the ost for traÆ x to traverse suh a seond link is 2x. Ating alone, with a single
paket to send, they would both send that paket through the shared link (ost of 1).
However by both doing so, they inur a larger ost (ost of 8) than if they had both used
their seond hoies (ost of 4). Without knowing what eah other will do ahead of time
(information not onventionally ontained in routing tables), the agents will neessarily
have mistaken ost estimates and therefore make inorret routing deisions. In this, even
in the limit of dierentially small pakets, use of SPA will lead to a wrong routing deision.
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2.2 Suboptimality of ISPA
We now analyze a situation where the routers may know what the loads are but are eah
ating to optimize the delays experiened by their pakets alone. Consider the network
shown in Figure 1. Two soure routers X and Y eah send one paket at a time, with X
sending to either intermediate router A or B, and Y sending to either B or C. This type
of network may arise in many dierent topologies as a subnetwork. Aordingly, diÆulties
assoiated with this network an also apply to many more omplex topologies.
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Figure 1: Independent deisions at the soure
Let x
A
, x
B
, y
B
, and y
C
, be the paket quantities at a partiular xed time t, at A, B,
or C, and originating from X or Y , as indiated. At t, eah soure has one paket to send.
So eah of our variables is binary, with x
A
+ x
B
= y
B
+ y
C
= 1. Have V
i
(z
i
) be the ost,
per paket, at the single instant t, at router i, when the total number of pakets at that
instant on that router is z
i
. So the total ost inurred by all pakets at the time t, G(~x; ~y),
equals x
A
V
A
(x
A
) + (x
B
+ y
B
)V
B
(x
B
+ y
B
) + (y
C
)V
C
(y
C
).
In an ISPA, X hooses whih of x
A
or x
B
= 1 so as to minimize the ost inurred by
X's paket alone, g
X
(~x)  x
A
V
A
(x
A
) + x
B
V
B
(x
B
+ y
B
). In doing this the ISPA ignores the
y
B
V
B
(x
B
+ y
B
) term, i.e., it ignores the \side eets" of X's deision. Real-world SPA's
typially try to approximate this by having X hoose either A or B aording to whether
V
A
(0) or V
B
(y
B
) is smaller, where those two values an be estimated via pings, for example.
The right thing to do from the point of view of minimizing the global ost of ourse
is instead to have X minimize G(~x; ~y), or more preisely, the omponents of G(~x; ~y) that
depend on X. Writing it out for this ase, X ought to at to minimize x
A
V
A
(x
A
) + (x
B
+
y
B
)V
B
(x
B
+ y
B
). Due to the onstraint that x
A
+ x
B
= 1, this means sending down A i
V
A
(1) < (y
B
+ 1)V
B
(y
B
+ 1)   y
B
V
B
(y
B
), whih diers from the ISPA result in that X is
onerned with the full ost of going through router B, not just the portion of that ost
that its paket reeives.
In the ontext of this example, thisG-minimizing algorithm onstitutes \load-balaning"
(LB). Note that so long as sgn[V
A
(0)   V
B
(y
B
)   y
B
V
0
B
(y
B
)℄ 6= sgn[V
A
(0)   V
B
(y
B
)℄, even
in the limit of innitesimally small traÆ (so that x
A
+ x
B
equals some innitesimal Æ),
ISPA and LB still disagree. LB onsiders side-eets of urrent routing deisions on other
traÆ urrently being routed. However beause it does not onsider side-eets of routing
deisions on future traÆ, even LB may not optimize global ost averaged aross all time,
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depending on the details of the system. However through the use of \eet sets" COINs
an aount even for suh delayed side-eets
2
.
2.3 Braess' Paradox
Let us onlude this setion with an illustration of Braess' paradox (Bass, 1992; Cohen
& Kelly, 1990; Cohen & Jeries, 1997; Glane & Hogg, 1995; Hogg, 1995; Korilis, Lazar,
& Orda, 1997b; Korilis et al., 1999), a phenomenon that dramatially undersores the
ineÆieny of the ISPA. This apparent \paradox" is perhaps best illustrated through a
highway traÆ example rst given by Bass (Bass, 1992): There are two highways onneting
towns S and D. The ost assoiated with traversing either highway (either in terms of tolls,
or delays) is V
1
+V
2
, as illustrated in Net A of Figure 2. So when x = 1 (a single traveler) for
either path, total arued ost is 61 units. If on the other hand, six travelers are split equally
among the two paths, they will eah inur a ost of 83 units to get to their destinations. Now,
suppose a new highway is built onneting the two branhes, as shown in Net B in Figure 2.
Further, note that the ost assoiated with taking this highway is not partiularly high (in
fat for any load higher than 1, this highway has a lower ost than any other highway in the
system). The benet of this highway is illustrated by the dramatially redued ost inurred
by the single traveler: by taking the short-ut, one traveler an traverse the network at a
ost of 31 units (2 V
1
+ V
3
). Adding a new road has seemingly redued the traversal ost
dramatially.
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Figure 2: Hex network with V
1
= 10x ; V
2
= 50 + x ; V
3
= 10 + x
However onsider what happens when six travelers are on the highways in net B. If
eah agent uses an ISPA, then at equilibrium eah of the three possible paths ontains two
travelers.
3
Due to overlaps in the paths however, this results in eah traveler inurring a
ost of 92 units, whih is higher than than what they inurred before the new highway was
built. The net eet of adding a new road is to inrease the ost inurred by every traveler.
This phenomenon is known as Braess' paradox.
2. A detailed disussion and proof of the suboptimality of LB is shown in appendix A. Sine LB is not
used in urrent systems and is hard to imagine ever being used, our experiments do not onsider it; it is
disussed here for pedagogial reasons.
3. We have in mind here the Nash equilibrium for this problem, where no traveler (or equivalently, no
router) an gain advantage by hanging strategies.
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3. Mathematis of Colletive Intelligene
One ommon solution to these types of side-eet problems is to have partiular agents
of the network (e.g., a \network manager" Korilis, Lazar, & Orda, 1995) ditate ertain
hoies to other agents. This solution an inur major brittleness and saling problems
however. Another kind of approah, whih avoids the problems of a entralized manager,
is to provide the agents with extra inentives that an indue them to take ations that are
undesirable to them from a strit SPA sense. Suh inentive an be in the form of \taxes"
or \tolls" added to the osts assoiated with traversing partiular links to disourage the
use of those links. Suh shemes in whih tolls are superimposed on the agents' goals are
a speial ase of the more general approah of replaing the goal of eah agent with a new
goal. These new goals are speially tailored so that if they are olletively met the system
maximizes throughput. A priori, a agent's goal need have no partiular relation with the
SPA-type ost inurred by that agent's pakets. Intuitively, in this approah, we provide
eah agent with a goal that is \aligned" with the global objetive, with no separate onern
for of that goal's relation to the SPA-type ost inurred by the traÆ routed by that agent.
In this setion, we summarize the salient aspets of a Colletive Intelligenes (COIN) (Wolpert,
Wheeler, & Tumer, 2000; Wolpert & Tumer, 1999). In this paper we onsider systems that
onsist of a set of agents, onneted in a network, evolving aross a set of disrete, onseu-
tive time steps, t 2 f0; 1; :::g. Without loss of generality, we let all relevant harateristis of
a agent  at time t | inluding its internal parameters at that time as well as its externally
visible ations | be enapsulated by a Eulidean vetor 
;t
with omponents 
;t;i
. We
all this the \state" of agent  at time t, and let 
;t
be the state of all agents at time t,
while  is the state of all agent aross all time.
World utility, G(), is a funtion of the state of all agents aross all time. When 
is an agent that uses a Mahine Learning (ML) algorithm to \try to inrease" its private
utility, we write that private utility as g

(), or more generally, to allow that utility to
vary in time, g
;
().
We assume that  enompasses all physially relevant variables, so that the dynamis
of the system is deterministi (though of ourse impreisely known to anyone trying to
ontrol the system). Note that this means that all harateristis of an agent  at t = 0
that aets the ensuing dynamis of the system must be inluded in 
;0
. For ML-based
agents, this inludes in partiular the algorithmi speiation of its private utility, typially
in the physial form of some omputer ode (the mathematis an be generalized beyond
ML-based agents, as elaborated in Wolpert & Tumer, 1999).
Here we fous on the ase where our goal, as COIN designers, is to maximize world utility
through the proper seletion of private utility funtions. Intuitively, the idea is to hoose
private utilities that are aligned with the world utility, and that also have the property
that it is relatively easy for us to ongure eah agent so that the assoiated private utility
ahieves a large value. In this paper, all utilities we onsider are of the form
P
t
R
t
(
;t
)
for reward funtions R
t
(simply
P
t
R
t
(
;t
) for non-time-varying utilities). From now on,
we will only onsider world utilities whose assoiated set of fR
t
g are all time-translations of
one another. In partiular, as shown below, overall network throughput is expressible this
way.
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We need a formal denition of the onept of having private utilities be \aligned" with
G. Construting suh a formalization is a subtle exerise. For example, onsider systems
where the world utility is the sum of the private utilities of the individual agents. This might
seem a reasonable andidate for an example of \aligned" utilities. However suh systems
are examples of the more general lass of systems that are \weakly trivial". It is well-known
that in weakly trivial systems eah individual agent greedily trying to maximize its own
utility an lead to the tragedy of the ommons (Hardin, 1968; Crowe, 1969) and atually
minimize G. In partiular, this an be the ase when private utilities are independent of
time and G =
P

g

. Evidently, at a minimum, having G =
P

g

is not suÆient to ensure
that we have \aligned" utilities; some alternative formalization of the onept is needed.
Note that in the simple network disussed in Setion 2.1, the utilities are weakly trivial,
sine G(~x; ~y) = g
X
(~x) + g
y
(~y). This provides another perspetive on the suboptimality of
ISPA in that network.
A more areful alternative formalization of the notion of aligned utilities is the onept
of \fatored" systems. A system is fatored at time  when the following holds for eah
agent  individually: A hange at time  to the state of  alone, when propagated aross
time, will result in an inreased value of g
;
() if and only if it results in an inrease for
G() (Wolpert & Tumer, 1999).
For a fatored system, the side-eets of any hange to 's t =  state that inreases its
private utility annot derease world utility. There are no restritions though on the eets
of that hange on the private utilities of other agents and/or times. In partiular, we don't
prelude an agent's algorithm at two dierent times from \working at ross-purposes" to
eah other, so long as at both moments the agent is working to improve G. In game-theoreti
terms, in fatored systems optimal global behavior orresponds to the agents' always being
at a private utility Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). In this sense, there an
be no tragedy of the ommons for a fatored system. As a trivial example, a system is
fatored for g
;
= G 8, a system onventionally alled a `team game'.
Furthermore, if our system is fatored with respet to private utilities fg
;
g, we want
eah agent to be in a state at time  that indues as high a value of the assoiated private
utility as possible (given the initial states of the other agents). Assume  is ML-based and
able to ahieve fairly large values of most private utilities we are likely to set it for time
 , i.e., assume that given that private utility g
;
, the rest of the omponents of 
;
are
set by 's algorithm in suh a way so as to ahieve a relatively high value of g
;
. So our
problem beomes determining for what fg
;
g the agents will best be able to ahieve high
g

(subjet to eah other's ations) while also ausing dynamis that is fatored for G and
the fg
;
g.
Dene the eet set of the agent-time pair (; ) at , C
eff
(;)
(), as the set of all agents


0
;t
whih under the forward dynamis of the system have non-zero partial derivative with
respet to the state of agent  at t =  . Intuitively, (; )'s eet set is the set of the states
of all agents 

0
;t
that would be aeted by a hange in the state of agent  at time  .
Next, for any set  of agents (
0
; t), dene CL

() as the \virtual" vetor formed by
lamping the omponents of the vetor  delineated in  to an arbitrary xed value, whih
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in this paper is set to 0.
4
This operation reates a new state vetor (e.g., worldline) where
the lamped omponents of that worldline (e.g., one player's ation at a partiular time
step) are \zeroed" (e.g., removed from the system).
The value of the wonderful life utility (WLU for short) for  is dened as:
WLU

()  G() G(CL

()): (1)
In partiular, we are interested in the WLU for the eet set of agent-time pair (; ). This
WLU is the dierene between the atual world utility and the virtual world utility where
all agent-time pairs that are aeted by (; ) have been lamped to a zero state while the
rest of  is left unhanged.
Sine we are lamping to
~
0, we an loosely view (; )'s eet set WLU as analogous
to the hange in world utility that would have arisen if (; ) \had never existed", hene
the name of this utility - f. the Frank Capra movie. Note however, that CL is a purely
\tional", ounter-fatual operator, in that it produes a new  without taking into aount
the system's dynamis. The sequene of states the agent-time pairs in  are lamped to
in onstruting the WLU need not be onsistent with the dynamial laws of the system.
This dynamis-independene is a ruial strength of the WLU. It means that to evaluate
the WLU we do not try to infer how the system would have evolved if agent 's state were
set to
~
0 at time  and the system evolved from there. So long as we know , extending over
all time, , and the funtion G, we know the value of WLU.
As mentioned above, regardless of the system dynamis, having g
;
= G 8 means the
system is fatored at time  .
Theorem: Regardless of the system dynamis, setting g
;
= WLU
C
eff
(;)
8 results in a
fatored system at time  .
Proof: The seond term, G(CL
C
eff
(;)
()) is, by denition, independent of 
;
. Therefore
a hange to only the (; ) omponent of  will only aet the rst term, G(). Therefore
the eet of suh a hange on the value of the world utility is the same as its eet on the
value of the wonderful life utility. QED.
Sine fatoredness does not distinguish the team game and wonderful life utilities, we
need some other means of deiding whih to use as our hoie of fg
;
g. To determine
this, note that sine eah agent is operating in a large system, it may experiene diÆulty
diserning the eets of its ations on G when G sensitively depends on all the agents in the
system. Therefore eah  may have diÆulty learning from past experiene what to do to
ahieve high g
;
when g
;
= G. In partiular, in routing in large networks, having private
rewards given by the world reward funtions means that to provide eah router with its
reward at eah time step we need to provide it the full throughput of the entire network
at that step. This is usually infeasible in pratie. Even if it weren't though, using these
private utilities would mean that the routers fae a very diÆult task in trying to disern
4. The hoie of the lamping parameter used in an assoiated COIN an aet its performane. However
within wide ranges, it doesn't aet whether suh a COIN outperforms alternatives like team games.
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the eet of their ations on their rewards, and therefore would likely be unable to learn
their best routing strategies.
This problem an be mitigated by using eet set WLU as the private utility, sine the
subtration of the lamped term removes muh of the \noise" of the ativity of other agents,
leaving only the underlying \signal" of how the agent in question aets the utility (this
reasoning is formalized as the onept of \learnability" in Wolpert & Tumer, 1999). A-
ordingly, one would expet that setting private utilities to WLU's ought to result in better
performane than having g
;
= G 8;  . This is the primary theoretial onsideration that
we leverage in the COIN tehniques investigated in this paper.
In pratie, we will sometimes only be able to estimate the \primary", most prominent
portion of the eet set. Tehnially, the assoiated WLU is not the eet set WLU, and
therefore not exatly fatored. However assuming that that assoiated WLU is lose enough
to being fatored, we would expet the advantage in learnability with suh a WLU to still
result in better performane than would using g
;
= G 8;  (see Wolpert et al., 2000;
Wolpert & Tumer, 1999). Indeed, for the sake of improving learnability, sometimes we will
elet to exlude ertain agent-time pairs from our estimate of the eet set of (; ), even
if we are sure that that are aeted by 
;
. This will be the ase if we expet that the
hanges in G due to varying 
;
that are \mediated" through those agent-time pairs are
relatively insigniant, and therefore eetively onstitute noise for the learning proess, so
that their eet on learnability is more important than their eet on fatoredness.
4. Colletive Intelligene for Network Routing
In this setion, we use the theory summarized in Setion 3 to derive individual goals for
eah router, in the form of private utility funtions to be maximized by appropriate hoie
of routing deisions. The routers tried to ahieve those maximizations by using algorithms
that only require limited knowledge of the state of the network (in partiular knowledge
that is readily available to routers in ommon real data networks). In our simulations eah
router used a Memory Based (MB) mahine learning algorithm (nearest neighbor) to make
routing deisions. More preisely, for eah potential routing deision, the routers look for
the past state that most losely losely mathes their urrent state (e.g., load). They then
assign an "estimated" utility value to eah potential routing deision and selet the ation
with the highest estimated utility value. We all this algorithm an MB COIN
5
.
4.1 Model Desription
To apply the COIN formalism to a network routing model, we must formally desribe
that as a set of deterministially evolving vetors 
;t
. In the model used in this paper, at
any time step all traÆ at a router is a set of pairs of integer-valued traÆ amounts and
assoiated ultimate destination tags. At eah suh time step t, eah router r sums the
integer-valued omponents of its urrent traÆ at that time step (one omponent for eah
5. Relatively minor details of the algorithm onerning exploration/exploitation issues along with a \steer-
ing" parameter are disussed at the end of this setion.
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ultimate destination) to get its instantaneous load. We write that load as:
z
r
(t) 
X
d
x
r;d
(t);
where the index d runs over ultimate destinations, and x
r;d
(t) is the total traÆ at time
t going from r towards d. After its instantaneous load at time t is evaluated, the router
sends all its traÆ to the next downstream routers, in a manner governed by the underlying
routing algorithm. We indiate suh \next routers" by writing:
x
r;d
(t) =
X
r
0
x
r;d;r
0
(t);
where r
0
is the next router for traÆ (r; d), i.e., the rst stop on the path to be followed
from router r to ultimate destination d. After all suh routed traÆ goes to those next
downstream routers, the yle repeats itself, until all traÆ reahes its destinations.
In our simulations, for simpliity, traÆ was only introdued into the system (at the
soure routers) at the beginning of suessive disjoint waves of L onseutive time steps
eah
6
. We use (t) to indiate either the integer-valued wave number assoiated with time
t or the set of all times in that wave, as the ontext indiates.
In a real network, the ost of traversing a router depends on \after-eets" of reent
instantaneous loads, as well as the urrent instantaneous load. To simulate this eet, we
use time-averaged values of the load at a router rather than instantaneous load to determine
the ost a paket inurs in traversing that router. More formally, we dene the router's
windowed load, Z
r
(t), as the running average of that router's load value over a window
of the previous W timesteps (W is always set to an integer multiple of L):
Z
r
(t) 
1
W
t
X
t
0
=t W+1
z
r
(t
0
) =
X
d
X
r;d
(t);
where the value of X
r;d
(t) is set by
X
r;d
(t) =
1
W
t
X
t
0
=t W+1
x
r;d
(t
0
)):
Intuitively, for large enough W , using suh a window to determine osts aross routers
means that typially those osts will only hange substantially over time sales signiantly
larger than that of the individual routing deisions. Formally, the windowed load is the
argument to a load-to-ost funtion, V (), whih provides the ost arued at time t by
eah paket traversing the router at this timestep. That is, at time t, the ost for eah
paket to traverse router r is given by V (Z
r
(t))
7
. Note that in our model, the osts are
arued at the routers, not the links. Also note that for simpliity we do not physially
instantiate the ost as a temporal delay in rossing a router. Dierent routers have dierent
6. L was always hosen to be the minimal number neessary for all traÆ to reah its destination before
the next wave of traÆ is initiated.
7. We also introdue \dummy routers" denoted by V
0
() = 0 whih help in translating the mathematis
into the simulations. Omitting them will have no eet on the simulations.
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V (), to reet the fat that real networks have dierenes in router software and hardware
(response time, queue length, proessing speed et). For simpliity, W is the same for all
routers however. With these denitions, world utility is given by
G() =
X
t;r
z
r
(t) V
r
(Z
r
(t))
=
X
t;r;d
x
r;d
(t)V
r
(Z
r
(t))
=
X
t;r;d
x
r;d
(t)V
r
0

1
W
t
X
t
0
=t W+1
X
d
0
x
r;d
0
(t
0
)
1
A
=
X
t;r;d
x
r;d
(t)V
r
 
X
d
0
X
r;d
0
(t)
!
: (2)
Our equation for G expliitly demonstrates that, as laimed above, in our representation
we an express G() as a sum of rewards,
P
t
R
t
(
;t
), where R(
;t
) an be written as funtion
of a pair of (r; d)-indexed vetors:
R
t
(x
r;d
(t);X
r;d
(t)) =
X
r;d
x
r;d
(t)V
r
 
X
d
0
X
r;d
0
(t)
!
:
Also as laimed, the R
t
are temporal translations of one another.
Given this model, some of the omponents of 
;t
must be identied with the values
x
r;d;r
0
(t) 8 r; d; r
0
and t, sine those x's are set by the ations the agents will take. Sine all
arguments of G must be omponents of , we also inlude the X
r;d
(t) 8r; d; t as omponents
of 
;t
. Formally, for routing based on ML agents, the internal parameters of the ML agents
must also be inluded in . This is beause those parameters aet the routing, and in
turn are aeted by it. So to have  evolve deterministially, sine it inludes the routing
variables, it must also ontain internal parameters of the agents. We won't have any need
to expliitly delineate suh variables here however, and will mostly phrase the disussion as
though there were no suh internal parameters.
Now the values fx
r;d;r
0
(t  1)g 8r; d; r
0
speify the values fx
r;d
(t)g 8r; d diretly. There-
fore, in onert with the fx
r;d
(t
0
< t)g, they also set the fX
r;d
(t)g diretly. Moreover in our
simulations the deisions fx
r;d;r
0
(t)g 8r; d; r
0
xed by the routing algorithms at all times t
are given by a xed funtion of the fx
r;d
(t)g and the fZ
r
(t) =
P
d
0
X
r;d
0
(t)g. So in point of
fat we an map the set of fx
r;d;r
0
(t  1);X
r;d
0
(t)g 8r; d; r
0
to the full set fx
r;d;r
0
(t)g 8r; d; r
0
,
not just to fx
r;d
(t)g. Aordingly, the x
r;d;r
0
undergo deterministi evolution. Sine their
values aross time set all the values of the X
r;d
(t) aross time, we see that the entire set of
the omponents of 
;t
undergo deterministi evolution in this representation, as required.
For evaluating the wonderful life utility we will need to group the omponents of 
;t
into disjoint agents . Here we will have two types of agent, both types being indexed by
router-destination pairs. For eah suh agent index (r; d), the rst agent type is the variable
X
r;d
(t), and the seond agent type is the Eulidean vetor with omponents indexed by r
0
,
(x
r;d
)
r
0
(t). In setting \ations" we are onerned with setting the states of the agents of
the seond type. Aordingly, our learners will all be assoiated with agents of this seond
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type. Unless expliitly indiated otherwise, from now on we will impliitly have that seond
type of agent in mind whenever we refer to a \agent" or use the symbol .
4.2 ISPA Routing and COIN Routing
Based on the COIN formalism presented in Setion 3 and the model desribed above, we
now present the ISPA and COIN-based routing algorithms. At time step t, ISPA has aess
to all the windowed loads at time step t 1 (i.e., it has aess to Z
r
(t 1) 8r), and assumes
that those values will remain the same at all times  t. Note that for large window sizes
and times lose to t, this assumption is arbitrarily aurate. Using this assumption, in
ISPA, eah router sends pakets along the path that it alulates will minimize the osts
aumulated by its pakets.
The COIN-based routing algorithms, in ontrast, do not have suh diret aess to the
Z
r
. So to evaluate the WLU for a agent (r; d) at any time  , suh an algorithm must
estimate the (primary members of the) assoiated eet set. This means determining what
omponents of 
;
will, under the dynamis of the system, be hanged by altering any of the
omponents of the vetor x
r;d
().
As a rst approximation, we will ignore eets on traÆ that hanging x
r;d;r
0
() may
have that are \mediated" by the learning algorithms running in the system. That is, we
ignore hanges that arise due to the the eets that hanging x
r;d;r
0
() has on rewards,
hanges whih indue hanges in future training sets, whih then in turn get mapped to
hanges in the fx
r;d;r
0
(t)g (and therefore the fX
r;d
(t)g) via the learning algorithms running
on the agents.
As another approximation, we will ignore eets mediated by the routing algorithms'
observations of the state of the network. That is, we ignore hanges in the fx
r
00
;d
0
;r
000
(t)g that
varying x
r;d
() may ause due to assoiated hanges in the state of the network pereived by
(r
00
; d
0
)'s routing algorithm, hanges that in turn ause that algorithm to modify its routing
deisions aordingly. We only onsider the behavior of those routing algorithms that are
(potentially) diretly aeted by x
r;d
() in that they (potentially) have to route pakets
that, at time  , passed through r on the way to d. So in partiular we ignore eets of
x
r;d
() on the fx
r
00
;d
0
6=d;r
000
(t)g.
Sine all pakets routed in a wave arrive at their destinations by the end of the wave,
these approximations mean that the only x
r
00
;d
00
;r
000
(t) that are in our estimate for x
r;d
()'s
eet set have t in the same wave as  . These are the only ones that are, potentially, diretly
aeted by the fx
r;d;r
0
(t)g by \haining together" the sequene of x
r
00
;d
00
;r
000
(t) that get the
pakets in x
r;d
(t) to their ultimate destination. Due to the wave nature of our simulations
though, the only x
r
00
;d
00
;r
000
(t) within  's wave that are aeted by x
r;d
() all have d
00
= d.
For reasons of oding simpliity, we do not onern ourselves with whether t <  within a
given wave and then exlude some x
r
00
;d
00
;r
000
(t) aordingly. In other words, all t within  's
wave are treated equally.
So one set of members of x
r;d
()'s eet set is fx
r
00
;d;r
000
(t) 8r
00
; d; r
000
; t 2 ()g. Note
that some of these members will be relatively unaeted by x
r;d
() (e.g., those with r
00
far
in the net away from r). Again for simpliity, we do not try to determine these and exlude
them. As with keeping the x
r
00
;d;r
000
(t < ), this inlusion of extra agents in our estimate of
the eet set should hurt learnability, but in general should not hurt fatoredness. Therefore
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it should delay how quikly the learners determine their optimal poliies, but it won't aet
the quality (for G) of those poliies nally arrived at. Note also that trying to determine
whether some partiular x
r
00
;d;r
000
(t 2 ()) should be inluded in x
r;d
()'s eet set would
mean, in part, determining whether pakets routed from (r; d) would have reahed r
00
if
(r; d) had made some routing deision dierent from the one it atually made. This would
be a non-trivial exerise, in general.
In ontrast to the ase with the x
r
00
;d
0
;r
000
(t), there are X
r
00
;d
0
(t) with t in the future of  's
wave that both are aeted by x
r;d
(t) and also are not exluded by any of our approximations
so far. In partiular, the X
r
00
;d
(t) with either r
00
= r or r
00
one hop away from r will be
diretly aeted by x
r;d
(t), for t 2 [
W 1
i=0
( + iL)) (f. the denition of the X variables).
For simpliity, we restrit onsideration of suhX
r
00
;d
variables to those with the same router
as r, r
00
= r.
This nal estimate for the eet set is learly rather poor | presumably results better
than those presented below would arue to use of a more aurate eet set. However it's
worth bearing in mind that there is a \self-stabilizing" nature to the hoie of eet sets,
when used in onjuntion with eet set WLU's. This nature is mediated by the learning
algorithms. If one assigns the same utility funtion to two agents, then the reward one
agent gets will be determined in part by what the other one does. So as it modies its
behavior to try to inrease its reward, that rst agent will be modifying its behavior in a
way dependent on what the other agent does. In other words, if two agents are given the
same WLU beause they are estimated to be in eah other's eet set, then ipso fato they
will be in eah other's eet set.
Using our estimate for the eet set, the WLU for (; ) is given by the dierene
between the total ost arued in  's wave by all agents in the network and the ost arued
by agents when all agents sharing 's destination are \erased." More preisely, any agent 
that has a destination d will have the following eet set WLU's, g
;
:
g
;
()= G() G(CL
C
eff
(;)
())
=
X
t;r
0
;d
0
x
r
0
;d
0
(t) V
r
0
 
X
d
0
X
r
0
;d
0
(t)
!
 
X
t;r
0
;d
0

x
r
0
;d
0
(t)(1   I(t 2 ())I(d
0
= d))

 V
r
0
 
X
d
00
[ X
r
0
;d
00
(t) (1  I(t 2 [
W 1
i=0
( + iL))I(d
00
= d)) ℄
!
=
X
t2()
X
r
0
0

X
d
0
x
r
0
;d
0
(t) V
r
0
(
X
d
00
X
r
0
;d
00
(t))  
X
d
0
6=d
x
r
0
;d
0
(t) V
r
0
(
X
d
00
6=d
X
r
0
;d
00
(t))
1
A
+
X
t2[
W 1
i=1
(+iL)
X
r
0
0

X
d
0
x
r
0
;d
0
(t) [V
r
0
(
X
d
00
X
r
0
;d
00
(t))  V
r
0
(
X
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where I(:) is the indiator funtion that equals 1 if its argument is true, 0 otherwise.
To allow the learner to reeive feedbak onerning its ations in a wave immediately
following that wave rather than wait for WL time steps, we will approximate the seond
sum in that last equality, the one over times following  's wave, as zero. There is another
way we an view the resultant expression, rather than as an approximation to the eet
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set WLU. That is to view it as the exat WLU of an approximation to the eet set, an
approximation whih ignores eets on future windowed loads of lamping a urrent traÆ
level. Regardless of what view we adopt, presumably better performane ould be ahieved
if we did not implement this approximation.
Given this approximation, our WLU beomes a wave-indexed time-translation-invariant
WL \reward funtion" (WLR):
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Notie that traÆ going from a router r
0
6= r to a destination d
0
6= d aets the value of
the WLR for agent (r; d). This reets the fat that WLR takes into aount side-eets
of (r; d)'s ations on other agents. Note also that eah r
0
-indexed term ontributing to the
WLR an be omputed by the assoiated router r
0
separately, from information available
to that router. Subsequently those terms an be propagated through the network to , in
muh the same way as routing tables updates are propagated.
Given this hoie of private utility, we must next speify how the COIN-based routing
algorithm ollets the initial data that (in onjuntion with this utility) is to be used to
guide the initial routing deisions that every agent with more than one routing option must
make. In our experiments that data was olleted during a preliminary running of an ISPA.
In this preliminary stage, the routing deisions are made using the ISPA, but the resulting
ations are \sored" using the WLR given by Equation 3. We use the ISPA to generate the
routing deisions in the initial data sine it is likely in pratie that some kind of SPA will
be the routing algorithm running prior to \turning on" the COIN algorithm. Alternately
one an generate the initial data's routing deisions by having the routers make random
deisions, or by having them implement a sequene of deisions that \sweeps" aross a grid
through the possible set of ations. The data olleted in this stage provides us with initial
input-output training sets to be used by the mahine learning algorithm on eah agent: for
eah router-destination agent, inputs are identied with windowed loads on outgoing links,
and the assoiated WLR values for the destination in question are the outputs.
After suÆient initial data is olleted using the ISPA, the system swithes to using
the COIN algorithm to make subsequent routing deisions. In this stage, eah agent routes
pakets along the link that it estimates (based on the training set) would provide the best
WLR. To perform the estimation, the MB COIN makes use of a single-nearest-neighbor
algorithm as its learner. This algorithm simply guesses that the output that would ensue
from any andidate input is the same as the output of the element of the training set
that is the nearest neighbor (in input spae) of that andidate input.
8
In other words, the
learner nds the training set input-output pair whose input value (loads on outgoing links)
8. This is a very simple learning algorithm, and we use it here only to demonstrate the potential pratial
feasibility of a COIN-based routing algorithm. The performane an presumably be improved if more
sophistiated learning algorithms (e.g., Q-learning Sutton & Barto, 1998; Watkins & Dayan, 1992) are
used.
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is losest to that whih would result from eah potential routing deision. Then the learner
assigns the WLR assoiated with that training data pair as the estimate for what WLR
would result from said routing deision. These WLR values are then used to hoose among
those potential routing deisions. The input-output data generated under this algorithm is
adding to the training set as it is generated.
In this routing algorithm, the routers only estimate how their routing deisions (as
reeted in their loads at individual time steps) will aet their WLR values (based on
many agents' loads). It is also possible to alulate exatly how the routing deisions aet
the routers' WLR's if, unlike the MB COIN, we had full knowledge of the loads of all
agents in the system. In a way similar to ISPA, for eah router we an evaluate the exat
WLR value that would ensue from eah of its andidate ations, under the assumption
that windowed loads on all other routers are the same one wave into the future as they are
now. We all this algorithm for diretly maximizing WLR (an algorithm we all the full
knowledge COIN, or FK COIN).
Note that under the assumption behind the FK COIN, the ation  hooses in wave ()
that maximizes WLR will also maximize the world reward. In other words, WL reward is
perfetly fatored with respet to (wave-indexed) world reward, even though the assoiated
utilities are not related that way (due to inauray in our estimate of the eet set). Due
to this fatoredness, the FK COIN is equivalent to load balaning on world rewards. Sine
LB in general results in inferior performane ompared to LB over time, and sine the FK
COIN is equivalent to LB, one might expet that its performane is suboptimal. Intuitively,
this suboptimality reets the fat that one should not hoose the ation only with regard
to its eet on urrent reward, but also with onern for the reward of future waves. In the
language of the COIN framework, this suboptimality an be viewed as a restatement of the
fat that for our inexatly estimated eet set, the system will not be perfetly fatored.
The learning algorithm of the MB COIN as desribed is extraordinarily rude. In addi-
tion, the assoiated sheme for hoosing an ation is purely exploitative, with no exploration
whatsoever. Rather than hoose some partiular more sophistiated sheme and tune it to
t our simulations, we emulated using more sophistiated algorithms in general. We did
this by modifying the MB COIN algorithm to oasionally have the FK COIN determine
a router's ation rather than the purely greedy learner outlined above. The steering pa-
rameter disussed in Setion 5.5 determines how often the routing deision is based on the
MB COIN as opposed to the FK COIN.
5. Simulation Results
In pratie, it is very diÆult to implement either FK COIN or LB. In this setion we use
experiments to investigate behavior of algorithms that an oneivably be used in pratie.
More preisely, based on the model and routing algorithms disussed above, we have per-
formed simulations to ompare the performane of ISPA and MB COIN aross a variety of
networks, varying in size from ve to eighteen routers. In all ases traÆ was inserted into
the network in a regular, non-stohasti manner at the soures. The results we report are
averaged over 20 runs. We do not report error bars as they are all lower than 0:05.
In Setions 5.1 - 5.4 we analyze traÆ patterns over four networks where ISPA suers
from the Braess' paradox. In ontrast, the MB COIN almost never falls prey to the paradox
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for those networks (or for no networks we have investigated is the MB COIN signiantly
suseptible to Braess' paradox). Then in Setion 5.5 we disuss the eet on the MB
COIN's performane of the \steering" parameter whih determines the intelligene of the
MB COIN.
9
5.1 Bootes Network
The rst network type we investigate is shown in Figure 3. It is in many senses a trivial
network, as in Net A, the soures do not even have any hoies to make. The loads intro-
dued at the soures do not hange in time and are listed in Tables 1 and 2, along with the
performanes of our algorithms.
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Figure 3: Bootes Network
Loads at (S
1
; S
2
) Net ISPA MB COIN
1,1 A 6.35 6.35
B 8.35 5.93
2,1 A 8.07 8.07
B 10.40 7.88
2,2 A 9.55 9.55
B 10.88 9.71
4,2 A 10.41 10.41
B 11.55 10.41
Table 1: Average Per Paket Cost for BOOTES2 networks for V
1
= 10 + log(1 + x) ; V
2
=
4x
2
; V
3
= log(1 + x) .
The MB COIN results are idential to the ISPA results in the absene of the additional
link (Network A). However, Braess' paradox arises with ISPA, in that the addition of the
new link in network B degrades the performane of the ISPA in six of the eight traÆ
regimes and load-to-ost funtions investigated. The MB COIN on the other hand is only
9. In Setions 5.1 - 5.4, the steering parameter is set at 0.5.
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Loads at (S
1
; S
2
) Net ISPA MB COIN
1,1 A 30.35 30.35
B 20.35 20.35
2,2 A 35.55 35.55
B 40.55 34.99
4,2 A 41.07 41.07
B 50.47 44.13
6,3 A 44.63 44.63
B 51.40 44.63
Table 2: Average Per Paket Cost for BOOTES4 network for V
1
= 50 + log(1 + x) ; V
2
=
10x ; V
3
= log(1 + x) .
hurt by the addition of the new link one, and manages to gainfully exploit it seven times.
When their behavior is analyzed innitesimally, the MB COIN either uses the additional
link eÆiently or hooses to ignore it in those seven ases. Moreover, the MB COIN's
performane with the additional link is always better than the ISPA's. For example, adding
the new link auses a degradation of the performane by as muh as 30 % (loads = f2; 1g)
for the ISPA, whereas for the same load vetor MB COIN performane improves by 7 %.
5.2 Hex Network
In this setion we revisit the network rst disussed in Setion 2.1 (redrawn in Figure 4 to
inlude the dummy agents). In Table 3 we give full results for the load-to-delay funtions
disussed in that setion. We then use load-to-ost funtions whih are qualitatively similar
to those disussed in Setion 2.1, but whih inorporate non-linearities that better represent
real router harateristis. That load-to-ost funtion and assoiated results are reported
in Table 4.
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Figure 4: Hex network
This network demonstrates that while the addition of a new link may be beneial in
low traÆ ases, it leads to bottleneks in higher traÆ regimes. For ISPA although the
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per paket ost for loads of 1 and 2 drop drastially when the new link is added, the per
paket ost inreases for higher loads. The MB COIN on the other hand uses the new
link eÆiently. Notie that the MB COIN's performane is slightly worse than that of the
ISPA in the absene of the additional link. This is aused by the MB COIN having to use
a learner to estimate the WLU values for potential ations whereas the ISPA simply has
diret aess to all the information it needs (osts at eah link).
Load Net ISPA MB COIN
1 A 55.50 55.56
B 31.00 31.00
2 A 61.00 61.10
B 52.00 51.69
3 A 66.50 66.65
B 73.00 64.45
4 A 72.00 72.25
B 87.37 73.41
Table 3: Average Per Paket Cost for HEX network for V
1
= 50+x ; V
2
= 10x ; V
3
= 10+x
.
Load Net ISPA MB COIN
1 A 55.41 55.44
B 20.69 20.69
2 A 60.69 60.80
B 41.10 41.10
3 A 65.92 66.10
B 61.39 59.19
4 A 71.10 71.41
B 81.61 69.88
Table 4: Average Per Paket Cost for HEX network for V
1
= 50 + log(1 + x) ; V
2
=
10x ; V
3
= log(1 + x) .
5.3 Buttery Network
The next network we investigate is shown in Figure 5. It is an extension to the simple
network disussed in Setion 5.1. We now have doubled the size of the network and have
three soures that have to route their pakets to two destinations (pakets originating at
S
1
go to D
1
, and pakets originating at S
2
or S
3
go to D
2
). Initially the two halves of the
network have minimal ontat, but with the addition of the extra link two soures from the
two two halves of the network share a ommon router on their potential shortest path.
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Figure 5: Buttery Network
Table 5 presents two sets of results: rst we present results for uniform traÆ through
all three soures, and then results for asymmetri traÆ. For the rst ase, the Braess'
paradox is apparent in the ISPA: adding the new link is beneial for the network at low
load levels where the average per paket ost is redued by nearly 20%, but deleterious at
higher levels. The MB COIN, on the other hand, provides the benets of the added link
for the low traÆ levels, without suering from deleterious eets at higher load levels.
Loads (S
1
; S
2
; S
3
) Net ISPA MB COIN
1,1,1 A 112.1 112.7
B 92.1 92.3
2,2,2 A 123.3 124.0
B 133.3 122.5
4,4,4 A 144.8 142.6
B 156.5 142.3
3,2,1 A 81.8 82.5
B 99.5 81.0
6,4,2 A 96.0 94.1
B 105.3 94.0
9,6,3 A 105.5 98.2
B 106.7 98.8
Table 5: Average Per Paket Cost for BUTTERFLY network for V
1
= 50+log(1+x) ; V
2
=
10x ; V
3
= log(1 + x).
For the asymmetri traÆ patterns, the added link auses a drop in performane for the
ISPA, espeially for low overall traÆ levels. This is not true for the MB COIN. Notie also
that in the high, asymmetri traÆ regime, the ISPA performs signiantly worse than the
MB COIN even without the added link, showing that a bottlenek ours on the right side
of network alone (similar to the Braess' paradox observed in Setion 5.1).
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5.4 Ray Network
In all the networks and traÆ regimes disussed so far the soures are the only routers with
more than one routing option. The nal network we investigate is a larger network where
the number of routers with multiply options is signiantly higher than in the previous
networks. Figure 6 shows the initial network (Net A) and the \augmented" network (Net
B), where new links have been added. The original network has relatively few hoies for
the routers, as pakets are direted toward their destinations along \onduits." The new
links are added in the augmented networks to provide new hoies (rossing patterns) that
ould be beneial if ertain of the original onduits experiene large osts.
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Figure 6: Ray network
Table 6 shows the simulation results for these networks (S
1
and S
2
send pakets to D
1
and D
2
respetively). At low load levels both the ISPA and the MB COIN use the new links
eetively, although the MB COIN performs slightly worse. This is mainly aused by the
diÆulty enountered by the simple learner (single nearest neighbor algorithm) in quikly
learning the traÆ patterns in this large network. Unlike the ISPA however, the MB COIN
avoids the Braess' paradox in all ases exept the very high traÆ regime. Moreover, even
there, the eet is signiantly milder than that enountered by the ISPA.
5.5 Steering the MB COIN
The nal aspet of COIN-based routing we investigate is the impat of the hoie for the
value of the steering parameter. This parameter both ontrols the amount of exploration
the algorithm performs and determines the \intelligene" of the MB COIN at estimating
the surfae diretly alulated by the FK COIN. In Figures 7 - 8, the FK COIN results
orrespond to setting the steering parameter of the MB COIN to 1:0. This provides an
upper bound on the performane that an be ahieved though MB COIN.
For the HEX network (Figure 7), the performane at the worst setting for the MB COIN,
whih orresponds to no steering, is omparable to ISPA. In ontrast, with moderate steering
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Loads at S
1
andS
2
) Net ISPA MB COIN
2,2 A 143.6 143.7
B 124.4 126.9
3,3 A 154.6 154.9
B 165.5 151.0
4,4 A 165.4 166.0
B 197.7 165.6
6,6 A 186.7 187.4
B 205.1 191.6
Table 6: Average Per Paket Cost for RAY network for V
1
= 50 + log(1 + x) ; V
2
=
10x ; V
3
= 10 + log(1 + x).
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Figure 7: Impat of steering on Hex4 (left) and Ray4 (right) networks.
(0.5) the results are similar to that of the FK COIN, as the learner has more information
to work with (arising from the extra parts of the input spae represented in the training
set due to the oasional use of the FK COIN), it bridges the gap between a suboptimal
algorithm suseptible to Braess' paradox and one whih eÆiently avoids that paradox.
For the RAY network (Figure 7), the value of the steering parameter is more ritial.
With no steering at all, the MB COIN performs poorly in this network | even worse than
ISPA. This is not surprising in that beause there are many routing hoies that aet
the performane, the simple memory-based learner needs proper \seeding" to be able to
perform well. Even with minimal steering though, the MB COIN quikly outperforms the
ISPA.
Finally, for both the Buttery and Bootes networks (Figure 8) the MB COIN needs
very little steering to perform well. Although for the Buttery network the performane of
MB COIN improves slightly with more information, it is signiantly better than the ISPA
aross the board.
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t of steering on Buttery4 (left) and Bootes4 (right) networks.
6. Conlusion
Eetive routing in a network is a fundamental problem in many elds, inluding data
ommuniations and transportation. Using a shortest path algorithm (SPA) on eah of the
routers to determine that router's deisions is a popular approah to this problem. However
under ertain irumstanes it suers from a number of undesirable eets. One suh eet is
Braess' paradox, where for the same pattern of introdued traÆ into a network, inreasing
the apaity of that network results in lower overall throughput, due to the harmful side-
eets of the deisions made by eah router on the traÆ in the rest of the system. Even
the theoretial load-balaning algorithm, whih addresses some of these eets to produe
deisions that are optimal for any single moment of time, an still suer from side-eets
that result in sub-optimal performane. This is beause suh eets extend aross time
(i.e., what you do now aets performane later) as well as spae.
The Colletive Intelligene approah is a novel way of ontrolling distributed systems so
as to avoid deleterious side-eets of routing deisions. The entral idea is to have learning
algorithms ontrol the autonomous agents that onstitute the overall distributed system.
In suh a Colletive Intelligene (COIN), the entral issue is to determine the personal
objetives to be assigned to eah of those autonomous agents. One wants to hoose those
goals so that the greedy pursuit of those goals by the assoiated learning algorithms leads to
desirable behavior of the overall system. In this paper we have summarized the mathematis
of designing suh goals and derived a routing algorithm based on that mathematis.
We ran omputer simulations to ompare a COIN-based algorithm with an ideal SPA
(whose performane upper-bounds all real-world SPA's) for routing. The COIN-based algo-
rithm was severely handiapped. The estimation of the \eet sets" used by that algorithm
was exeedingly rude. In addition, the learning algorithms of the agents were partiularly
unsophistiated, and therefore were not able to eetively maximize their individual perfor-
manes. In ontrast, the ideal SPA had aess to more information onerning the state of
the system than the (real-world-implementable) COIN did, information that no real-world
SPA ould aess.
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Despite these biases in favor of the ideal SPA, in our experiments the ideal SPA indued
average osts as muh as 32 % higher than the COIN-based algorithm. Furthermore the
COIN-based algorithm almost always avoided the Braess' paradox that seriously diminished
the performane of the SPA.
These tehniques have also been very suessfully employed in many other, non-routing
domains, suh as oordination of autonomous rovers (Tumer, Agogino, & Wolpert, 2002),
ombinatorial optimization, \ongestion games" (Wolpert & Tumer, 2001), and ontrol of
data-upload from a planet (Wolpert, Sill, & Tumer, 2001). We onlude from these results
that the tehniques of the eld of olletive intelligene an be highly eetive in designing
the utility funtions of the members of a MAS to ensure they work in a oordinated and
eÆient manner to optimize overall performane. We are urrently investigating extensions
of our COIN algorithm that involve novel goals for the agents, goals that are more \learn-
able" for the learning algorithms. We are also expanding the simulations to larger networks
using a ommerial event driven simulator. Future work will fous on not making the ap-
proximation that urrent traÆ levels do not aet future windowed loads (Equation 3).
It will also involve investigating better estimates of eet sets, in partiular not inluding
all agents with the same destination in one's eet set, and more generally using a more
\ne-grained" representation of the agents, for example inluding eah paket's originating
soure, to allow a more ne-grained eet set (and resultant WLU).
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Appendix A. Suboptimality of Load-Balaning
In this appendix we we present an existene proof of the suboptimality of Load-Balaning
(LB) by expliitly onstruting a situation where onventional LB is suboptimal.
Consider a system with disrete time, in whih the soure agent X under onsideration
must route one paket to the (xed) destination at eah time step. Presume further that
no traÆ from any soure agent other than X enters any of the agents X sends to, so that
traÆ oming from X is the sole soure of any osts assoiated withX's outbound links. Let
S(t) be the number of times our agent sent a paket down some link A in the W time steps
preeding t, and take s(t) = A;B to mean that the router uses link A or B, respetively, at
time t. Model queue bakups and the like by having the ost to send a paket down link
A at time t be C
A
(S(t)=W ), and have the ost for our router to instead send the paket
down link B be C
B
(1  S(t)=W ), For simpliity we assume that both C
A
(:) and C
B
(:) are
monotonially inreasing funtions of their arguments.
Restrit attention to agents that work by having s(t) = A i S(t)  k for some real-
valued threshold k. The LB algorithm will hoose s(t) = A i C
A
(S(t)=W )  C
B
(1  
S(t)=W ). So the LB algorithm's behavior is indistinguishable from this kind of threshold
algorithm, with k set so that C
A
(k=W ) = C
B
(1  k=W ). (We impliitly assume that C
A
(:)
and C
B
(:) are hosen so that suh a solution exists for 1 < k < W   1.) The question is
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what k should be to optimize total averaged ost aross time, and in partiular if that k is
the same as k
LB
, the k that LB uses.
Now as we go from one time step to the next, the routing deision made W time steps
ago drops out of the omputation of S(t), while the routing deision just made is newly
inluded. In general, S(t+1) = S(t)+ 1 if the router just used A at time t and used link B
at the time W time steps into the past. On the other hand, S(t+1) = S(t) 1 if the router
just used B and used A W time steps ago, while S(t+1) = S(t) if the routing deision just
made is the same as the routing deision W time steps ago. So in general, S(t) an only
hange by -1, 0, or +1 as we go from one time step to the next.
Consider ases where 1 < k < W   1, so that eventually the router must hoose an A,
and at some subsequent time t

the router swithes from A to B. At that time s(t

 1) = A
and s(t

) = B. This implies that S(t

  1)  k; S(t

) > k. Dene the value S(t

  1) as k

.
Note that S(t

) = k

+ 1, and k   1 < k

 k.
Now for any time t
0
, if S(t
0
) = k

+ 1, s(t
0
+ 1) = B, and the only possible next values
are S(t
0
+ 1) = k

or S(t
0
+ 1) = k

+ 1, depending on the old deision s(t W ) that gets
dropped out of the window. Similarly, if S(t
0
) = k

, s(t
0
+ 1) = A, and the only possible
next values are S(t
0
+ 1) = k

or S(t
0
+ 1) = k

+ 1, again depending on the old deision
being dropped. So we see that one S(t
0
) 2 fk

; k

+ 1g, it stays there forever.
This means that beause of the relationship between k and k

, in any interval of W
onseutive time steps subsequent to t

, the number of pakets sent along A by router X
must be 2 (k 1; k+1℄. (Note that it is possible to send k+1 pakets along A, but not k 1
pakets. Therefore the number sent along B must be 2 [W   (k + 1);W   (k   1)). Eah
time that a paket is sent along A the ost inurred is the ost of link A with average traÆ
level S(t)=W , C
A
(S(t)=W ). Similarly, eah time the link B is hosen, the ost inurred is
C
B
(1   S(t)=W ). Sine S(t) 2 fk

; k

+ 1g, and both C
A
(:) and C
B
(:) are monotonially
inreasing, the ost for sending the paket down link A 2 (C
A
((k  1)=W ); C
A
((k+ 1)=W ℄,
and that for sending it down link B is ontained in [C
B
(1 (k+1)=W ); C
B
(1 (k 1)=W )).
Now we know that the hoie of A must have average frequeny (aross all time) between
k

=W and (k

+1)=W . Similarly, B will have average frequeny between (1  (k

+1)=W )
and 1  k

=W . Aordingly, the average ost is bounded above by
k

+ 1
W
C
A

k + 1
W

+

1 
k

W

C
B

1 
k   1
W

; (5)
where the rst term provides the maximum possible average ost for using link A, while
the seond term independently provides the maximum possible average ost for using link
B. Note that the atual ost will be lower sine the two frequenies in this bound, one for
A and one for B, annot both have the values indiated. Beause k  1 < k

 k and sine
1 
k 1
W
= 1 +
2
W
 
k+1
W
, our upper bound is itself bounded above by
k + 1
W
C
A

k + 1
W

+

1 +
2
W
 
k + 1
W

C
B

1 +
2
W
 
k + 1
W

: (6)
The optimal k will result in an average ost lower than the minimum over all k of the
upper bound on average ost, given in Equation 6. So the average ost for the optimal
k is bounded above by the minimum over k of this upper bound. Lable this argmin of
Equation 6 k'.
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Sine other values of k besides k
LB
result in behavior equivalent to LB, it does not
suÆe to simply test if k' = k
LB
. Instead let us evaluate some lower bounds in a similar
fashion to how we evaluated upper bounds. Using the average frequenies disussed above,
the average ost is bounded below by:
k

W
C
A

k   1
W

+

1 
1
W
 
k

W

C
B

1 
k + 1
W

; (7)
where the rst term provides the minimum possible average ost for using link A, while the
seond term provides the minimum possible average ost for using link B. Again, beause
k   1 < k

 k, the term is Equation 7 is further bounded below by
k   1
W
C
A

k   1
W

+

1 
2
W
 
k   1
W

C
B

1 
2
W
 
k   1
W

: (8)
In partiular this bound holds for the average ost of the LB algorithm:
k
LB
  1
W
C
A

k
LB
  1
W

+

1 
2
W
 
k
LB
  1
W

C
B

1 
2
W
 
k
LB
  1
W

; (9)
where as before k
LB
satises C
A
(k
LB
=W ) = C
B
(1  k
LB
=W ).
By appropriate hoie of C
A
(:) and C
B
(:), we an ensure that the lower bound on the
ost with the LB algorithm (Equation 9 evaluated with k = k
LB
) is higher than the upper
bound on the average ost inurred by the optimal algorithm (the minimum over k of Equa-
tion 6). That is, the best possible average ost ahieved by load balaning will be worse
than the worst average ost that ould arise through the optimal routing strategy. This
establishes that LB does not engage in optimal routing.
Example: Let C
A
(x) = x
2
and C
B
(x) = x. Balaning the loads on A and B | setting
C
A
(S(t)=W ) = C
B
(1 S(t)=W ) | results in (S(t)=W )
2
= 1 S(t)=W , leading to k
LB
=W =
p
5 1
2
= :618. For W = 1000, the assoiated lower bound on average ost (Equation 9) is
(:618)
3
+ (:998   :618)
2
= :380. On the other hand, with C
A
and C
B
given as above, Eq 6
is (
k+1
W
)
3
+ (1 +
2
W
 
k+1
W
)
2
. Dierentiating with respet to k and setting the result to
zero leads to
k
0
W
=  
1
3
 
1
W
+
p
28+48=W
6
. For a window size of W = 1000, this yields
k
0
=W = :548, a dierent result than k
LB
. Plugging into Equation 6, the upper bound on
the ost with k
0
is (:549)
3
+ (1:002   :549)
2
= :371, whih is less than :380.
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